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Abstract 
Although pioneering studies using statistical methods in geographical data analysis were 
published in the 1930s it was only in the 1960s that their increasing use in human geography 
led to a claim that a ‘quantitative revolution’ had taken place. The widespread use of 
quantitative methods from then on was associated with changes in both disciplinary 
philosophy and substantive focus. The first decades of the ‘revolution’ saw quantitative 
analyses focused on the search for spatial order of a geometric form within an, often 
implicit, logical positivist framework. In the first of three reviews of the use of quantitative 
methods in human geography this progress report uncovers their origin with regard to the 
underlying philosophy, the focus on spatial order, and the nature of the methods deployed. 
Subsequent reports will outline the changes in all three that occurred in later decades and 
will chart the contemporary situation. 
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Some fifty-five years ago, Ian Burton (1963) claimed that not only had geography ‘[i]n the past 
decade undergone a radical transformation of spirit and purpose’, which he thought was ‘best 
described as the “quantitative revolution”’ but also that ‘it reached its culmination in the period 
from 1957 to 1960, and is now over’. That conclusion was presumptuous; indeed – in the strict sense 
of the term ‘revolution’ – it was wrong in the long- as well as the short-term. Geographers in North 
America may have all been aware by 1960 of the debates regarding quantification and theory raging 
there, but most in the rest of the world were certainly not.1 Furthermore, there was never a 
revolution, if by that term we understand total change following overthrow of the status quo. The 
‘revolutionaries’ goal, exemplified in retrospect by Gould’s (1979) scathing essay, was to end the 
dominance of regional geography and in this they were partly successful, especially in the UK by the 
1970s. Gould (1979, 139) saw the period involving ‘breaking out of the banal, factual boxes erected 
by the old men’, who ‘misread the signs and pinned on the wrong labels. It was not the numbers 
that were important but a whole new way of looking at things geographic’ – p. 141 – seeking, in 
Whitehead’s words, to identify ‘what is general in what is particular and what is permanent in what 
is transitory’. Gould’s generation was ‘sick of the bumbling amateurism and antiquarianism that had 
spent nearly half a century of opportunity in the university piling up a tipheap of unstructured 
factual accounts’; ‘Geography had stagnated for decades, without tools, without methodological 
                                                          
1 One of us (RJ) was an undergraduate at the University of Manchester between 1959 and 1962 and heard not 
a whisper about it; only in the following two years, as a postgraduate reading more widely than specified 
earlier, did he encounter the relevant literature and debates about theory and statistics. 
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insight and development, without principles and constructs that gave coherence and order to 
observations’ (p. 143). The use of statistics offered a useful methodology and although some of the 
early applications were – as Spate (1960) observed – ‘naïve and inappropriate’ the enlarged 
paradigm within which they were applied was set in a philosophical framework whereby geography 
now shared ‘the questions of the sciences, something no field defined by inquiry into the particular 
and the unique could tolerate’ (Gould, 1979, 143). 
 
Quantitative-theoretical work never achieved disciplinary dominance, however, even in areas such 
as urban geography (as illustrated by Wheeler, 2002), partly because of resistance – not only from 
some traditional ‘regional geographers’ but also in historical and cultural geography too, plus some 
resistant economic and social geographers. The quantifiers had established a strong position in most 
North American geography departments, as exemplified by compulsory courses in statistics there; 
LaValle et al. (1967) reported that courses in quantitative methods were offered in 78 per cent of 
graduate schools in 1965, compared to only 3 per cent a decade earlier. But their putative revolution 
had failed; no sooner had they established this strong bridgehead than other revolutions were being 
fomented, offering alternative approaches to the discipline with very different epistemological and 
ontological foundations, let alone methodological protocols. 
 
The period from the end of the 1950s to the early 1980s was characterised by strident debate 
between protagonists for the alternatives vying for precedence within the discipline, but there was 
no outright winner. Since then, the debates over quantification have become much more muted – 
although the developments in what became Geographical Information Science were subject to 
considerable attack from some quarters (e.g., Pickles, 1995). Instead, a mutual accommodation has 
been adopted (Cresswell, 2013), with adherents to the various positions content that each continues 
to be practised within the discipline’s portfolio – although there have been continued contests for 
resources (teaching positions and graduate studentships within departments, for example) and 
occasional attempts to enhance one group’s position by ‘writing out’ one or more of its competitors 
(as in textbooks: Johnston, 2006). Such widespread mutual tolerance has in many cases been 
associated with mutual misunderstanding and avoidance, however, associated in some by 
misrepresentations. 
 
Quantitative human geography, broadly defined, has been the subject of many such 
misrepresentations, not least because of the extent to which it has changed very substantially since 
the 1960s-1970s, changes that have gone unrecognised in a number of recent human geography 
textbooks (Johnston et al., 2014a, 2014b). This series of three reports has thus been designed to 
document the extent of those changes, encapsulating the history of quantitative human geography 
over nearly six decades. Progress is rarely linear and cumulative (Albury and Schwartz, 1982); every 
generation fights its own battles and too much is forgotten, too easily but better understanding of 
the present requires an appreciation of the past battles, what was done and then rejected – and 
why. This first report thus establishes the foundations of quantitative human geography, focusing on 
three major components of the initial ‘revolution’ during its first two decades: philosophy, space, 
and methods. The next will describe the major changes that occurred in all three over subsequent 
decades, as a prelude to the final paper which will evaluate where ‘quantitative geography’ is 
currently at and going to. 
 
Three revolutionary movements  
 
There is no comprehensive, single-volume treatment of the nature of the original ‘quantitative 
revolution’. Wayne Davies (1972) provided an early overview, and Trevor Barnes (2003, 2004) has 
written a several influential essays on the North American experience, alongside which one of the 
main activists has penned an autobiography (Berry, 2006); Peter Haggett (2005; see also Cliff et al., 
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1995) and Stan Gregory (1976, 1983) have reflected on events in the UK, and their roles therein. This 
paper complements them by identifying the three main, inter-linked, themes in the original 




Much of the original stimulus to the ‘revolution’ in North America was a growing realisation by some 
geographers that their discipline – human geography in particular; physical geography was then a 
relatively weak disciplinary component there – was intellectually inferior to the main social science 
disciplines, notably economics, sociology and political science. To a greater or lesser extent, they 
based their arguments on parallels drawn with the natural sciences, especially physics, whose law-
seeking orientation involved mathematical rigour (Bunge, 1966, 203ff, reviews much of this 
literature). Geography was increasingly seen as offering little more than ‘mere description’ based on 
vague causal linkages between environmental conditions and human behaviour. Such bland 
empiricism should be replaced, it was argued, by adoption of the positivist approach to science. 
Observed patterns should not be portrayed as singular occurrences but rather as exemplars, possibly 
unique depending on contingent circumstances, of the operation of one or more interacting general 
laws. As set out in a seminal paper arguing this position (Schaefer, 1953), since geography is a 
discipline concerned with space then geography’s laws should be spatial laws. 
 
This position was to some extent only implicit in the debates that raged in those decades, but it 
underpinned many empirical papers published then. It occupied a central place in two of the 
pioneering textbooks, however. The first part of Abler, Adams and Gould’s (1971) book on Spatial 
Organization, with the telling subtitle The Geographer’s View of the World, began with a discussion 
of science and scientific explanation, before proceeding to outline geography’s subject matter: 
understanding orientation took precedence over appreciating content. Haggett’s (1965) earlier 
volume, Locational Analysis in Human Geography, took the same stance, although its ‘philosophical’ 
section was shorter; it was soon complemented, however, by Harvey’s (1969) entire volume on 
Explanation in Geography which set out a positivist (to some, logical positivist) manifesto in 
considerable detail, although the word does not appear once in that volume. (It was also a 
philosophy that Harvey appeared to have rejected by the time of his next book – Social Justice and 
the City, 1973.) 
 
As made clear by the title of another revolutionary textbook, An Introduction to Scientific Reasoning 
in Geography, the goal was to introduce geographers to ‘scientific reasoning’ (Amedeo and Golledge, 
1975). To them – and to other advocates such as Bunge (1966) – geographers had traditionally 
undertaken work that was descriptive and taxonomic but involved little or no theory construction or 
hypothesis testing – characteristics they associated with scientific practice. Change was occurring, 
however; geography, which meant human geography since it was increasingly seen as a separate 
sub-discipline, was adopting scientific reasoning, as illustrated by Harvey’s (1969) conclusion – ‘by 
our theories you shall know us’. There were some attempts to identify common ground with physical 
geographers – notably around methods as illustrated by two volumes emanating from a joint 
summer school in 1966 (Garrison and Marble, 1967a, 1967b) and in the United States’ National 
Research Council report (1965) on The Science of Geography – but they had little success; indeed a 
1979 issue of the Annals of the Association of American Geographers celebrating the Association’s 
75th anniversary contained no essays on or by physical geographers (Marcus, 1979). Chorley and 
Haggett’s (1965, 1967) two scene-setting edited volumes on changes to the discipline incorporated 
both physical and human geography, as did the serial Progress in Geography that they launched in 
1969. This was split into the two separate journals – Progress in Human Geography and Progress in 
Physical Geography – in 1977 after a survey conducted by the publisher, John Davey, a split that 
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Peter Haggett certainly regretted; his introductory textbook – Geography: a Modern Synthesis 
(Haggett, 1972) – sought to maintain the discipline’s wider unity.  
 
But only one form of scientific reasoning was promoted at the time – that adopted by logical 
positivists who argued that theory was built, and laws eventually derived, through the empirical 
testing of hypotheses derived from theoretical models, frequently rooted in (Newtonian) laws of 
physics. Tests were devised to verify the theory and not, as Popper had argued, to falsify it. Few 
authors adopted that alternative approach to science, and it was not fully adumbrated until the 
appearance of Bird’s (1975, 1993) critique: Petch and Haines-Young (1975; Haines-Young and Petch, 
1980) had argued its relevance to physical geography. 
 
Focus: spatial order 
 
What should form the subject matter of that scientific reasoning? Science is the search for order so 
geography, it was argued, should be the search for spatial order (Haggett, 1990), and its language 
should be geometry (Bunge, 1966) – a spatial order that, as Michel (2016) argues, can be visualised. 
 
But what order? Although they were all marginal to their home disciplines, several economists and 
sociologists had been exploring spatial order. One of their books – more specifically a particular 
footnote therein (Lösch, 1954) – stimulated Peter Haggett’s decision to explore that literature and 
his 1965 book, based on several years teaching the material at Cambridge, brought it together in a 
coherent framework. The core was spatial interaction – contacts and movements between places. 
(According to Cox, 1976, the revolution involved a major switch from a focus on vertical relationships 
– between people and their local environments – to one on the horizontal – on relationships 
between places.) In Haggett’s schema those interactions are confined into channels, whose 
networks connect places – nodes that are ordered into hierarchies. The intervening areas comprise 
surfaces with patterns of, for example, land use changing with distances from the nodes and the 
channels. He added a further element to that schema in the book’s second edition (Haggett et al., 
1977) – diffusion, patterns of change that emanate down the hierarchies along the channels as well 
as across the surfaces. Spatial order was thus presented as the outcome of social processes, which 
themselves were organized and influenced by the spatial configuration and dispersion of their 
participants. 
 
Abler, Adams and Gould adopted a similar approach, though without an overarching schema. Morrill 
(1970), in a parallel pioneering text that said little about either philosophy or methods, focused on 
spatial order as the core element of ‘the science of geography’. As in the other books, spatial order 
was largely seen as reflecting the influence of distance on human behaviour: geography was being 
presented, in the words of a Scottish-Canadian geographer not associated with the ‘revolution’, as a 
‘discipline in distance’ (Watson, 1955; Johnston, 2003b) – or, as a historian expressed it at the time, 
the tyranny of distance (Blainey, 1966). The models to be tested proposed patterns reflecting the 
costs of crossing distance, and few – a major exception was Nystuen (1963) – attempted to produce 




Although the philosophical foundations and emphasis on spatial order underpinned the changes that 
the revolutionaries sought, the proposed methodological changes attracted most attention – both 
positive and negative – and led to their nomination as a ‘quantitative revolution’. Its importance to 
the proposed changes was stressed in Abler et al.’s book that moved from its introductory chapters 
on the nature of science to one on ‘Measurement’ which they argued (1971, 111): 
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… is rarely undertaken for its own sake. Rather it forms a crucial link in the chain leading 
from initial hunches and questions to intellectually satisfying explanations. On a map, for 
example, it might appear that tuberculosis decreases with distance from a city. But to move 
beyond such a geographic speculation we need accurate values of tuberculosis rates at 
carefully measured distances from the center. Only then can we investigate the relationship 
between the two variables, and perhaps uncover other factors, such as poverty, that explain 
the spatial variation of the disease. 
In other words, as Cole (1969) expressed it more forcibly in his critique of a leading text on the 
regional geography of the British Isles, precision in establishing relationships (putative laws) requires 
exact measurement and irrefutable – because of the way in which they are presented – statements 
of relationships. Haggett made a similar argument. The validity of theoretical models of spatial order 
can only be established using empirical data. But those data are to be gathered and presented 
(1965, 185) 
… not simply to add to the present jumble of regional literature that we already have to 
hand, but in order that our existing concepts may be critically examined. It is all too easy to 
collect information in human geography, all too hard to collect information which is 
significant and relevant to specific locational questions … [hence the remainder of the book] 
follows the well-established paths of experimental design [although most of the work was 
observational rather than experimental], moving from the collecting of evidence through to 
the testing of hypotheses.  
In most cases that testing involves statistical analyses (p.286):  
Few innovation waves have swept through geographical study more rapidly or more 
decisively than the vogue for statistical analysis. In 1955 the use of statistical methods in 
most geographical research papers was a curiosity …; by 1965 many American geographical 
journals … carried many papers with a high statistical content and even the more 
conservative English journals were showing weak trends in this direction.2 
Although methods were marginal to Harvey’s philosophical concerns in Explanation in Geography, 
nevertheless he too stressed the importance of making rigorous statements using mathematical 
languages (p.378): ‘… mathematical methods allow us to make objective statements about pattern. 
… [replacing] intuitive descriptions of, say, settlement patterns (using such vague terms as 
“dispersed”. “nucleated”, and the like) by an objective measure’. 
 
This emphasis on the necessity for quantification was taken by many practitioners as fundamental to 
the changes in orientation being proposed, hence the widespread adoption of the term ‘quantitative 
revolution’, even by those not part of the vanguard (e.g. Balchin, 1993). The clear implication was 
that in order to practice that ‘new geography’ a facility in statistical methods to extract order (or 
pattern) from noise (stochastic variation) was a sine qua non, which meant that geography students 
required an introduction to the methods – and preferably had a mathematical background in their 
high school education. Textbooks were needed. 
 
The first such book, explicitly written by a geographer for geographers, promoted neither changes in 
disciplinary philosophy nor a new focus on spatial order: its sole focus was on the rigorous use of 
statistical methods to analyse geographical data. Stanley Gregory was a climatologist whose 
undergraduate degree included courses from another climatologist – Percy Crowe – who was the 
first geographer to promote the study of variance and probability in handling statistical data (Crowe, 
                                                          
2 Haggett was one of the pioneers who published one of those early papers in a conservative English journal 
(Haggett, 1964), having previously delivered it at a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society. It was presented 
in the discussion then, by Sir Dudley Stamp, as possibly a steam hammer cracking a nut and Chorley (1995, 
360) relates how Haggett was later reprimanded by his head of department for bringing ‘the subject of 
geography into disrepute by applying such mathematical methods’. 
 6 
 
1933).3 Gregory adopted, adapted and extended that approach in his pioneering research on British 
rainfall when teaching at the University of Liverpool in the 1950s. He not only determined that 
students of climatology needed an appreciation of statistical data handling but was encouraged by 
his colleagues to make his innovative undergraduate practical courses – the first was given in 1957 – 
relevant to all geographers, human as well as physical, albeit meeting with some considerable 
resistance (Johnston, 2018). The material was honed and formed the basis for Statistical Methods 
and the Geographer (Gregory, 1963). It contained nothing about philosophy, about theories, laws 
and models, nor about spatial order; rather, because ‘it is increasingly apparent that the raw 
material with which the geographer is presented is becoming progressively more of a quantitative 
nature’ (p. xiii) then ‘a necessary corollary follows, that these numerical data should be analysed by 
sound statistical methods so that maximum value is obtained from them’ (p. xiv). His book was 
designed to introduce standard statistical techniques ‘particularly applicable to geographical 
problems’. It was a primer, from which many British academic geographers of the 1960s-1970s 
cohorts gained their basic appreciation of statistical procedures (the book went through four 
editions, the last appearing in 1978). Only descriptive procedures were discussed; there was no 
testing of hypotheses, merely means of making precise, unambiguous statements about frequency 
distributions, sampling, the differences between distributions, correlation, and bivariate regression. 
 
Whereas for Gregory learning about statistical methods was largely a means of ensuring that 
quantitative data were used properly, to others their adoption was part of a wider manifesto for 
changing geographical practices. Haggett’s (1965) book was split into two parts – ‘Models of 
locational structure’ and ‘Methods in locational analysis’ – with the latter necessary for the 
evaluation of the models described in the former. The range of methods presented was much wider 
than Gregory’s, and firmly set in a hypothesis-testing framework, but the chapters were not 
presented as a primer; to find out how to apply the methods students would have to go elsewhere. 
The same was the case with Abler et al.’s volume: methods were introduced and illustrated, but not 
how they could be applied.  
 
Other textbooks followed, including two from staff at the University of Nottingham (Cole and King, 
1968; Ebdon, 1978) where pioneering quantitative work was linked with developments in computer 
and remote sensing applications (Mather, 1976; Unwin and Dawson, 1985); an early North American 
text was King (1969). And in 1975 the Quantitative Methods Study [now Research] Group of the 
Institute of British Geographers inaugurated its series of CATMOG (Concepts and Techniques in 
Modern Geography) booklets, short texts designed ‘to fill a teaching need in the field of quantitative 
methods in undergraduate geography courses’.4 (The Study Group was established by Barry Garner 
and Stan Gregory in 1964 to promote usage of quantitative methods across geography, although it 
did not formally affiliate with the IBG until 1968 because Gregory – then a member of the Institute’s 
Council – thought that to do so would be the ‘kiss of death’ because of opposition from many senior 
geographers: Gregory, 1976, 1983; Johnston, 2018. A parallel Mathematical Modeling and 
Quantitative Methods Speciality Group of the Association of American Geographers – now named 
the Spatial Analysis and Modeling Speciality Group of the American Association of Geographers – 
was established in 1979; its name was changed in 2000.5)  
                                                          
3 Unwin (1999, 2) records that those who think that ‘UK quantitative geography … was all to do with Haggett 
and Chorley on a supposed “Cambridge (Chorley) to Bristol (Haggett) axis” should note that there was also 
another axis from Manchester to London with two unsung and largely forgotten influences from climatologists 
Crowe and Gregory’. 
4 The first eight were on Markov Chain Analysis; Distance-Decay Models; Canonical Correlation Analysis; Spatial 
Interaction Shopping Models; Trend Surface Analysis; Classification; Factor Analysis; and Principal Components 
Analysis. By 1983, thirty-nine of these booklets had been produced. A total of fifty-nine booklets was 
eventually produced, and they are now available online - http://www.qmrg.org.uk/catmog/index.html. 






Despite Burton’s claim, the quantitative revolution was certainly not over by 1960, but within a 
decade or so of that date much of what had been proposed had been generally accepted as part of 
geography’s portfolio and was covered in university courses – such as the three-year honours degree 
in the discipline that was provided by almost all English universities at the time (Whitehand, 1970). 
 
Such changes were seen by Berry and Marble (1968, 4) as all three elements of the ‘revolution’ – 
philosophy, the search for spatial order, and quantification – having entered the disciplinary 
mainstream: 
A new paradigm has been implanted in geography, in which the implicit definition of 
legitimate problems and research methods is significantly different from that of a generation 
ago. 
The methods were quantitative, but ‘quantitative analysis cannot function in the absence of a sound 
theoretical base’ (p. 6). It was not just a ‘quantitative revolution’, therefore; it was a ‘conceptual 
revolution’ which placed ‘technical ability in its true perspective; it is but one weapon in the whole 
methodological and procedural armoury’ (Davies, 1972, 9). To many of those involved it was also a 
part of moves to make geography more ‘relevant’ or ‘applicable’, and therefore acceptable more 
widely within the academic division of labour. (Johnston, 2003a, and Smith, 1987, illustrate the 
difficulties geographers had winning acceptance in many universities.) The dominant early American 
centre of work illustrating all three components of the revolution was the Department of Geography 
at the University of Washington, Seattle, where a group of graduate students – widely termed the 
‘space cadets’ (Dunbar, 2002) – worked with William Garrison on a range of projects associated with 
planning new spatial orders (as in their pioneering book: Garrison et al., 1959 – see also Garrison, 
2002). In the United Kingdom, Alan Wilson – trained as a mathematician whose introduction to 
spatial analysis came when he chaired Oxford City Council’s Transport Committee, which led to his 
pioneering role at the Centre for Environmental Studies in London and then an appointment as a 
professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Leeds in 1970 – introduced 
mathematical modelling to the discipline as the basis for applicable tools (e.g. Wilson, 1974). He, 
too, sought to maintain links between physical and human geography (Wilson, 1981) and also co-
authored a text on mathematics for geographers (Wilson and Kirkby, 1975). 
 
The two decades leading up to the mid-1970s saw those three components of the revolution – 
philosophy, spatial order, quantification – firmly established within geography, but they had not 
taken the discipline over. As standard histories, notably of human geography (Johnston and Sidaway, 
2016), show, no sooner had they achieved what appeared to be strong permanent positions within 
the disciplinary portfolio than they came under attack from approaches based on very different 
philosophies and methodologies, and which sought a very different order – or none at all. 
Regardless, locational analysis – or spatial analysis, or spatial science – remained firmly in place as 
one of the discipline’s significant components although the amount and level of statistical teaching 
has since diminished. In the UK, geography is included as part of wider concerns about the poor 
levels of numeracy amongst social science graduates (though they are generally better in geography 
than in several other disciplines there) and in national initiatives within both schools and Universities 
that have sought to address this problem (Harris, 2018; Harris et al., 2016, 46, refer to a ‘quantitative 
de-skilling’ within British human geography). 
 
By the mid-1970s spatial science was also being changed from within: the philosophy was 
substantially modified; the order sought was different; and the methodological armoury moved in 
new directions. Having established the foundations, charting those changes is the focus of the next 
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